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I.  Introduction:  Public Choice and Environmental Policy 
 
 
This chapter reviews the contributions that public choice research and scholarship 
have made to our understanding of the decisions of governments responding to 
environmental issues.  The literature examined concentrates on domestic policy making 
within the United States, although occasional reference is made to the growing literature 
that studies European and international decision making.  Much of this literature is 
theoretical, while a growing portion of it is descriptive.  At the same time, public choice 
analyses are routinely invoked in discussions about the appropriate role of government in 
addressing environmental problems, where the implications of this literature takes on 
normative implications as well.  This chapter considers the theoretical, the descriptive 
and the normative dimensions of the literature.   
 
A portion of the public choice literature, especially some of its influential early 
work, depicts government as a system in which all participants ignore welfare-improving 
actions in favor of ones that advance their own narrow self-interests, and where 
participants representing economically powerful special interests predominate.  The 
results are government decisions that routinely benefit industry and concentrated wealth 
at the expense of broad citizen concerns about environmental quality.  The normative 
implication seems clear:  Anyone concerned with the public interest or simply opposed to 
being victimized by the self-interested motives of someone else ought to avoid putting 
important environmental decisions in the hands of such a system, if possible.   
 
More recent work has exposed several flaws in this descriptive account.  One 
constant throughout the literature insists on examining “politics without romance,” by 
maintaining the hypothesis that public officials do not someone magically abandon their 
own interests upon assuming their public responsibilities in order to embrace an entirely 
public-minded agenda.  Even so, research now strongly suggests that -- while self-interest 
remains a powerful presence in politics -- public officials also act on their own 
convictions, including their convictions about the public good, and their decisions can 
reflect broad-based public interests as well as narrow, concentrated economic interests.  
A further refinement, which partially explains this more nuanced view of elected 
officials, comes from studies showing that broad-based interests are sometimes capable 
of effectively projecting their interests into the public arena, a possibility that the early 
public choice literature discounted too quickly.  These refinements have several 
important payoffs.  As a descriptive matter, models that account for the influence of 
broad-based interests as well as for the tendency of public officials to respond to mixed 
motives do a better job predicting the outcomes of government decisions than those that 
do not (Farber & Frickey 1991, p. 33), and hence form a sounder basis for normative 
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discussions of government performance. (Jim Rossi describes a similar trajectory and 
makes similar observations about improved descriptive accuracy in his chapter on energy 
regulation and deregulation, this volume.) Furthermore, public choice has always claimed 
a methodological commonality with neoclassical microeconomics and its study of 
markets, yet the models upon which the bleak picture of government have been based 
were methodologically incompatible with market theory.  Some of the most important 
methodological inconsistencies are corrected by these refinements.  Finally, the 
normative implications of these improved descriptive accounts change. 
 
**** 
 
Public choice research has had a long engagement with environmental issues.  In 
a sense, the two grew up together.  The modern environmental era in the United States 
was launched in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with Congress first enacting an 
impressive number of important environmental statutes and then the Environmental 
Protection Agency and other federal agencies promulgating extensive regulations to 
implement those statutes.  In just this same time frame, seminal works in public choice’s 
study of legislation and regulation were being published, such as Mancur Olson’s The 
Logic of Collective Action (1965) and George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic 
Regulation” (1971).   These early works focused on the then-dominant forms of federal 
economic regulation, but soon a large public choice literature developed applying the 
ideas of these early works to the expanding world of environmental regulation.     
 
Even before public choice engaged with environmental issues, its intellectual 
predecessor, microeconomics, had already done so, but for very different reasons.  
Microeconomics’ axiomatic account of how ideally functioning markets can produce a 
social maximum naturally invites inquiry into whether actual markets conform to the 
conditions necessary to achieve such a maximum. One of the necessary conditions is the 
absence of externalities of the sort that environmental problems typically exemplify. It 
was thus nearly inevitable that microeconomics’ study of market failure would generate 
recommendations specifically aimed at improving market performance in the presence of 
environmental externalities, eventually producing a tool kit that includes pollution taxes, 
fee systems, marketable permits, and expansion of private ownership as means to 
improve the performance of markets in the face of such externalities.   
 
Because the idea of a society getting the most it can out of the use of scarce 
resources is normatively attractive, advocates of measures like these frequently appealed 
to public decision makers to adopt them.   More often than not, these recommendations 
did not receive warm receptions, as legislatures and agencies pursued quite different 
approaches to regulating the environment.  Public choice enters the story at this point, 
offering to explain why the recommendations of its market theory colleagues are so 
frequently ignored.  Unlike microeconomics, however, public choice did not first develop 
an axiomatic account of the ideal conditions that would produce socially optimal 
government decisions and then ask how the conditions under which actual governments 
operate may cause governments to fall short of the ideal.  Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
taught that it was impossible to identify socially attractive conditions within which any 
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decision making mechanism could simply aggregate individual public preferences based 
on votes, analogous to the way in which markets can aggregate individual private 
preferences based on willingness to pay.  Instead, public choice approached government 
by taking the individual behavioral assumptions that microeconomics uses in market 
settings, applying them to public decision makers, and seeking to understand what kinds 
of decisions would result.  The prediction that emerged was that such government 
decision makers would systematically exploit their government positions for their own 
gain – just as market actors are assumed to do – but that the government setting lacked a 
comparable invisible hand to produce socially desirable outcomes from these privately 
motivated actions.    So, unlike microeconomics’ treatment of markets, public choice 
lacks any general account of the conditions that could theoretically produce such 
normatively attractive results, and it does not generally generate recommendations for 
how government decision making can be improved.  Instead, it offers accounts of 
government failure, predicting that government decisions will deviate from the socially 
optimal because the decisions will be dominated by narrow, well-endowed interests that 
are best equipped to advance the self-interest of government decision makers. Its take 
away message from these predictions echoes the conclusion of President Reagan in his 
first inaugural address: “government is not the solution to our problems, government is 
the problem.”   
 
That normative message obviously depends upon the reliability of the descriptive 
account.  If government does not in fact respond to problems as public choice models 
predict, there is less reason to endorse recommendations that are based on those very 
predictions.  Environmental problems and the numerous programs that governments have 
enacted and implemented in reaction to them provide a fertile proving ground for public 
choice’s descriptive account, and hence also for refining its normative message.    
 
The following two sections elaborate upon how the connection between the study 
of market failure and the study of government failure has evolved.  Early public choice 
theorists observed that governments frequently failed to follow the advice of market 
theorists in their responses to correcting for environmental externalities, and offered a 
theory of government failure as an explanation. After tracing this relationship in Sections 
II and III, Sections IV identifies two ways in which the earliest descriptions offered by 
public choice were actually inconsistent with its own professed methodology.    When 
these theoretical flaws are corrected, public choice’s descriptive models improve.  
Sections IV and V review the literature regarding four significant questions common to 
much environmental policy making, illustrating the evolution of public choice 
contributions to our understanding of environmental policy making.  The final section 
offers suggestions for further research.   
 
II. Markets, Market Failure and the Environment 
 
Microeconomics grounds market theory on a parsimonious set of assumptions.  It 
assumes that individuals are rational in that they have a coherent set of preferences.  This 
starting point only concerns the structure of individual preferences and assumes nothing 
about the content of those preferences.  Regarding what people actually prefer, the 
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guiding principle is de gustibus non est disputandum – there is no questioning someone’s 
tastes.  As for how preferences are structured, “coherence” assumes that individuals can 
rank order their preferences in a way that avoids inconsistencies such preferring A to B, 
B to C and then also C to A.  Beyond these assumptions regarding preferences, 
individuals are also assumed to pursue those preferences by making strategic decisions:  
they survey the group of choices available to them and then select the one that promises 
the highest ranked package of preferences.  Finally, if welfare is represented as 
preference-satisfaction, market theory demonstrates that if individuals for whom these 
assumptions are true exchange goods and services with each other through private 
exchanges that themselves must satisfy some necessary conditions, the resulting 
allocation of goods and services within the society as a whole will achieve a social 
welfare maximum, as measured by willingness to pay.  It is a social maximum because 
any further adjustment in goods and services, such as by regulation, would leave 
someone with a lower ranked group of preferences than she held prior to the adjustment, 
without benefiting anyone else sufficiently so that the beneficiary would be willing to pay 
the loser enough to induce a voluntary exchange between the two.  If someone had been 
willing to make such a payment, the exchange would have already occurred.   
 
The price mechanisms of the market produce this result.  Prices are bid up until 
buyers are not willing to pay a higher price because the good does not bring sufficient 
benefit to be worth paying more, and sellers will not drop the price to attract more buyers 
because the money they would get from the purchase is not sufficient to offset to costs 
they incur in providing the good to the buyer.  Prices therefore settle at the point where 
marginal benefits equal marginal costs.   With marginal benefits and costs equal, anyone 
who does not have a good is someone whose marginal benefit from attaining it (again, 
registered by willingness to pay) is not great enough to offset the marginal cost incurred 
by taking it from someone who currently has it.  This implies that any transfers that are 
made outside the market structure will reduce social welfare and that market transactions 
have achieved a social welfare maximum.   
 
Societies have goals other than allocative efficiency, including equitable or 
distributional goals; these goals might be served by constraining or regulating markets. 
Even so, market theorists often insist that constraining or regulating markets to advance 
such other goals is generally an inferior means of advancing those other values, because 
such interventions impair the market’s resource allocation capabilities, shrinking the total 
welfare pie.  Better, in their view, that society should achieve other objectives through 
measures like monetary transfer programs that do not directly interfere in markets.    
Market regulation ought to be restricted to cases in which existing markets fall short of 
achieving efficient allocations, and then its objective ought to be primarily directed at 
corrections that will improve the allocative performance of those actual markets.  
 
Here is where market theory engages environmental policy.  One of the 
conditions that ideal markets must satisfy in order to allocate resources optimally is that 
private exchanges must not generate appreciable costs or benefits that the parties to the 
exchange fail to take into account.   If such costs or benefits external to market 
transactions do exist, then the prices established by the market will not be set at the place 
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where marginal benefits equal marginal costs.  When the transaction generates external 
benefits, the goal of maximizing social welfare would argue for more of the goods to be 
produced, because the functioning market will fail to incorporate some existing additional 
willingness to pay that would give sellers an incentive to produce more than they actually 
have.  Conversely, when the transaction generates external costs, markets will 
overproduce, because some costs that would have reduced supply have been left out of 
account.  In either case, markets will fail to maximize society’s welfare, as represented by 
willingness to pay.   
 
Economics textbooks often illustrate the problem of externalities with 
environmental examples.  They are easy to grasp, involve familiar situations and attract 
student interest.  For example, suppose the process that a paper company uses to 
manufacture paper generates pollution that flows into the neighboring river, killing fish 
downstream, which the population downstream would otherwise eat.   If the paper 
company had to purchase fish from those downstream fish eaters, just as it must purchase 
the raw materials that it uses in producing its products, the company’s costs and 
consequently its prices would rise and less paper – and less pollution -- would be 
produced.  But because the fish eaters’ costs are externalities, the price of paper is set too 
low and too much paper and pollution are produced.  
 
Economists have long appreciated the problem of externalities and have 
developed a number of ideas about how to address the problem.  When A. C. Pigou 
analyzed the problem of externalities, he saw a role for government to intervene in a 
positive way.  “It is possible,” he wrote, “for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the 
divergence in any field by ‘extraordinary encouragements’ or ‘extraordinary restraints’ 
upon investment in field.”  (Pigou 1920, p. 192).  To address the problems created by the 
paper manufacturer, Pigou preferred a tax equal to the external costs to the fish eaters.  
With that tax in place, the price that the manufacturer agreed to in selling its product 
would have to be able to defray the costs that were formerly external to the transactions.  
Internalizing the externalities in this way would once again permit the price mechanism 
to set marginal benefits equal to total marginal costs, correcting the resource 
misallocation that the externality otherwise created. 
 
Methods other than a tax could also be employed to approximate the results of 
fully internalized costs.  A certain amount of pollution could simply be prohibited by the 
state, either plant-by-plant or in the form of a cap-and-trade program applicable to 
numerous sources, or particular technological methods of controlling pollution could be 
mandated.  Provided that these techniques ended up with approximately the result that 
market transactions with fully internalized costs would achieve, the result would improve 
the existing situation in terms of allocational efficiency.  Of these options, economists 
have generally preferred the approach of imposing a Piguovian tax to internalize the 
externalities.  Even when policies other than such a tax are being advocated, the 
underlying externality/market failure diagnosis of environmental problems has proven 
powerful as a powerful justification for government intervention because the diagnosis is 
widely taken to be reliable and improving allocational efficiency – increasing the size of 
the pie – is taken to be desirable, ceteris paribus.  The market and externality-based 
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analysis of environmental problems has been thoroughly developed in numerous works 
including The Theory of Environmental Policy, Baumol and Oates (1975) and Markets 
and the Environment, Keohane and Olmstead (2007). 
 
III. Government Choices, Government Failure and the Environment 
 
Notwithstanding the cogency of the externality/market failure diagnosis and the 
logic behind recommendations to improve market functioning, when market theorists 
took their ideas into the public arena, they often came away disappointed.  Government 
frequently failed to follow their advice.  Public choice theory now enters the scene, 
bringing a message of explanation to their market theory colleagues.  For public choice 
theorists, their colleagues’ disappointment bordered on the naïve, because it indicated 
that the market theorists were “largely assum[ing] that political actors are mainly 
concerned with the public interest.” (Tullock, Seldon and Brady 2002, p.4)  While it is 
doubtful that many people who have actually had experience trying to persuade elected 
officials to act have ever been quite that naïve, taking the time to advocate a social-
welfare improving government policy does seem to require a belief that public officials 
place some value on the public interest, that they will listen to arguments based on the 
public interest and that they will respond positively to them some of the time.  Otherwise, 
why make the effort?     
 
Some public choice theorists met even this more modest version of “public 
interest” theory with skepticism, however.  In fact, they thought that any market theorist 
who approached government with this frame of mind was guilty of a certain  
inconsistency.  When thinking about human behavior in the market context, market 
theory assumes human beings to be rational and motivated to maximize his or her own 
welfare.  Those assumptions are in principle completely generalizable, seemingly having 
nothing to do with the immediate market setting in which the individual is making 
choices.  To the public choice theorist, market theorists’ “public interest” expectation for 
government behavior implicitly relies upon a bifurcated view of human behavior, in 
which assumptions about human motivations mysteriously change when the institutional 
setting changes from the market to the public arena.  This more complicated view ought 
to require some justification.  Until the advocates of the public interest theory of 
government have carried the burden of proof on the issue of why basic assumptions 
concerning human behavior should be complicated in this way, public choice theorists 
argued that the rational welfare maximizing assumptions ought to be maintained 
throughout, whether public or private decisions were being made. (Buchanan 1984, p. 13-
14)  Public choice proceeded to develop a theory of government performance based on 
applying these universal assumptions to public as well as private decision making.  
Where “Pigou saw government as an environmental manager, a benevolent agent 
unaffected by special interest demand for government favors,” public choice saw 
government officials as self-interested. (Yandle 1999, p. 8).   
 
Not content to defend this position simply by shifting the burden of proof to the 
other side, public choice theorists also set out to verify that actual government 
performance could be explained better if one assumed that the behavioral assumptions 
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that worked so well in market settings did indeed extend to public decision making 
settings as well. Their general claim soon generated a research program that constructed 
models of government and then sought to verify them.  To give its work some interesting 
flavor, the public choice literature was also salted with numerous anecdotal illustrations 
of its basic thesis. For instance, Milton Friedman, whose most famous work sought to 
change the way in which the Federal Reserve managed the money supply, put public 
choice’s core diagnosis in the following way: 
 
 “Only recently have I come to the conclusion that the Federal 
Reserve System’s imperviousness to my technical advice reflects 
neither the wrongness of the advice nor the ignorance of the powers 
that be, but rather the simple fact that the self-interest of those 
powers and of the Federal Reserve System would not have been 
served by adopting that advice.  Could a System that had restricted 
itself to maintaining a steady and moderate rate of growth in the 
quantity of money conceivably have acquired the prestige and 
influence that the System now has?  Would the head of a system that 
had limited itself to that modest and feasible task be regarded in poll 
after poll as the second most powerful person in the land?” 
(Friedman 1985, p. 18) 
 
Earlier, George Stigler had offered a similar diagnosis.  Remarking on how 
economists regularly criticized regulatory agencies such as the ICC for failing to adopt 
measures consistent with maximizing social welfare, Stigler wrote that “this criticism 
seems to me exactly as appropriate as a criticism of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company for selling groceries, or as a criticism of a politician for currying popular 
support.”  Arguments and persuasion based on the public interest are ineffective in such 
settings.  “The fundamental vice of such criticism is that it misdirects attention: it 
suggests that the way to get an ICC which is not subservient to the carriers is to preach to 
the commissioners or to the people who appoint the commissioners. The only way to get 
a different commission would be to change the political support of the commission, and 
reward commissioners on a basis unrelated to their services to the carriers.” (Stigler 1971, 
p. 16) 
 
In and of themselves, the criticisms that public choice leveled at the behavior of 
government were not new; when Stigler wrote, capture theory was an established school 
of thought within political science.  Traditional capture theory, however, relied heavily 
upon close historical observation of prior agency behavior. (E.g., Bernstein 1955).  Public 
choice instead sought to systematize the study of government.  By postulating that the 
actions of governments can be explained and anticipated through an analysis that 
presumes that public officials are rational self-interested maximizers, public choice 
defines “a program of scientific endeavor that expose[s] government failure.” (Rowley 
1993, Vol. I, p. xiv).  Anecdotal accounts such as Friedman’s and Stigler’s can provide 
color for public choice’s criticism of government but as a research program public choice 
theory aspires on systematic theoretical elaboration and testing.   
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Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action (1965) informs many of the public 
choice models of government action, and raises an issue that is crucially important for the 
analysis of environmental decision making.  Olson applied rational actor, welfare-
maximizing assumptions to one of the basic building blocks of politics, interest groups.  
Olson reasoned that the presumption of political theories of pluralism that interest groups 
somehow just formed around a shared concern was an inadequate explanation for why 
individuals would engage in costly behavior that might bestow large group benefits, but 
small individual benefits.  By failing to analyze the problem from the perspective of a 
rational, welfare-maximizing individual, this approach to group formation commits the 
same error as the “public interest” theory about elected officials.  When Olson corrected 
the error by analyzing the individual costs and benefits that rational individuals confront 
in deciding whether to act collectively or not, he predicted that groups would be hard to 
organize when the group activity promised to produce benefits that were spread out 
among beneficiaries in amounts that are small for each beneficiary.  In the case of such 
broad-based groups, each individual would see that her contribution to the group effort 
had little chance to affect her own personal fortunes -- either others would contribute 
enough so that she could free-ride on their efforts or others would not contribute and the 
minimal amount she was willing to contribute would not put the effort over the top.  In 
either case, no benefits to her would be produced by her contribution, and hence it would 
be irrational to join in the group effort.  In contrast, smaller groups containing members 
who stand to gain more concentrated benefits would be better able to organize, either 
because a single member would have enough at stake to underwrite much of the effort 
individually, or because some subgroup would be small enough to overcome the 
transactions costs associated with reaching an agreement to pool sufficient resources to 
produce the benefit.  Compared to broad-based groups, concentrated groups thus enjoy a 
comparative advantage with respect to their ability to organize to advance group interests 
compared to groups facing diffuse, individually small benefits. 
 
Using Olson’s insights, Stigler argued that the regulation he observed was the 
logical result of the domination by the industry being regulated, a concentrated group 
compared to the diffuse group of consumers who might have desired welfare-improving 
regulation.  For Stigler, “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit.” (Stigler 1971, p.3)  Unlike Bernstein’s earlier thesis 
that regulatory capture developed as regulatory agencies matured, Stigler’s theory 
suggests that industry interests dominate regulatory design from its very conception in the 
legislature, a view consistent with revisionist histories of the ICC by Kolko (1965) and 
MacAvoy (1965), whose examination of the early regulatory history of the ICC led them 
to conclude that the ICC was created to shore up a railroad cartel that was operating 
privately with only moderate success. 
 
Stigler’s rudimentary model of interest groups and regulatory agencies has been 
improved upon significantly, but even its primitive form embodies the distinctiveness of 
the public choice approach.  While other students of regulation had observed the fact that 
regulatory decisions frequently fell short when judged against a market-correction ideal, 
students of public choice claim that they can provide a systematic explanation of why 
they do -- an explanation based on a generally applicable theory of government.  The key 
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to the theory is that because individuals are rational and strategic, they will react in 
predictable ways to the choices they face:  they will make the choice that maximizes their 
own welfare.  If this is no less true in the context of political institutions than in the 
market, and if the sequence of choices that must be made in order to produce a political 
result, along with the incentives and costs presented at each choice, can be identified and 
modeled, political outcomes can in principle be systematically characterized and 
predicted. Developing adequate models of the political process has proven challenging, 
but so long as modeling disagreements occur within a conceptual framework that 
encompasses the rational actor assumption, they fit within the public choice paradigm. 
 
The predictions about government performance that flow from Stigler’s and 
similar models are systematically “grim” and “pessimistic” about the ability of 
government action to improve overall social welfare.  In these models, government 
choices are effectively dominated by concentrated economic interests who are better able 
to reward government officials.  (Mashaw 1997, p. 21; Eskridge 1988, p. 288; Krueger 
1974).  In that environment, the decision public officials make will enable concentrated 
interests to gain advantages that they could not achieve even in flawed markets.  Overall, 
the effect of public choice’s diagnosis of government failure “is to encourage cynicism 
about governmental institutions, and to promote hostility toward any invocation of the 
coercive powers of the state.”  (Merrill 1997, p. 1070) 
 
IV. Developments in Public Choice Research about Environmental Politics 
 
Environmental externalities are generated by phenomena that vary in their 
chemical, biological or physical composition, in their spatial distribution, in how long 
their effects endure, in the harms they cause, in the methods through which they can be 
mitigated or remediated, and in how costly it is to mitigate or remedy them.  Government 
responses to them also vary, in part due to the differences in these characteristics, and in 
part due to the characteristics of the political environment in which the problems are 
addressed.  Whatever the specific government responses are, they typically must face up 
to four basic questions:  (1) whether or not government action is warranted; (2) if it is, the 
scope and stringency of the government action, including the manner in which a 
bureaucracy will implement and enforce any statutory standards; (3) the level of 
government that will assume responsibility; and (4) the type of regulation, or regulatory 
instrument, that will be employed.  A considerable public choice literature examines each 
of these questions.  The last two issues are the subject of the section following this one.  
This section takes up the first two.  In the course of doing so, it traces two refinements in 
public choice theory:  incorporating a more accurate understanding of the possibility for 
broad-based collective action, and acknowledging a broader and more realistic range for 
the preferences of public officials.     
 
The earliest public choice models were also vulnerable to a number of ancillary 
criticisms besides those that led to these refinements.  The models often treated 
governments as monolithic rather than structurally complex.  Relatedly, many early 
models were entirely demand-side models – examining the nature of the demand for 
regulation from concentrated interests – virtually ignoring the supply side – the political 
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process through which regulation is produced.  (Keohane, Revesz and Stavins 1997, pp. 
4-5) Both of these limitations diminished the usefulness and reliability of the models.  
Many analysts also did not simply accept the rational actor assumption uncritically. 
Challenges to that assumption are, however, outside the scope of this chapter, which 
focuses on developments within the public choice paradigm itself.  Here, the issue has not 
been whether rational actor models are appropriate ones for the analysis of government 
decisions, but rather whether or not rational actor assumptions are being properly defined 
and applied.  In two significant respects, the most pessimistic predictions of government 
performance turn out to be based on work that fails to remain faithful to those underlying 
assumptions.  The following two subsections examine how more recent scholarship has 
been correcting for these errors.   
 
A.  Collective Environmental Action 
 
In the models that predict the most grim or pessimistic results from government 
action to protect the environment, concentrated economic interests effectively dominate.  
While some regulatory contexts do exhibit this kind of narrow interest group domination, 
to predict that this will always or routinely be so when government addresses 
environmental problems misinterprets Olson’s collective action logic.  That logic does 
not suggest that large diffuse groups can never effectively organize so as to counteract the 
influence of concentrated special interests. His argument was only that, in light of the 
costs of collective action, in situations where the incentives that accrue directly from such 
action are small, such groups face additional obstacles compared to smaller groups in 
which each member has a greater stake in the outcome. These conditions do not 
accurately describe every situation in which environmental policy is being determined, 
and when different conditions are present, large groups can organize effectively.  Indeed, 
Olson’s Logic of Collective Action contains an entire chapter exploring how large groups 
use incentives other than individual material benefits in order to produce collective 
action.  Far from thinking such action to be impossible, Olson argued that further study 
was necessary to understand from a public choice perspective how collective action by 
broad-based groups succeeded.  A growing literature examines how diffuse groups 
overcome their disadvantages to succeed in organizing in different areas, including 
environmental advocacy.  (Chong 1991, Everett & Peirce 1992, Lubell 2002, Lubell et al. 
2006)   
 
The organizational difficulty facing collective action is structurally the same as 
the multi-person prisoners’ dilemma often present in common pool resources problems.  
Consistently with the models that routinely predict agency capture, Hardin’s “tragedy of 
the commons” suggested that all such situations lead to overuse because that is where a 
rational actor would see his individual self-interest to be best advanced. (Hardin 1968).  
Once again, however, research such as Elinor Ostrom’s demonstrates that groups can find 
means to manage the environmental problems associated with common pool resources to 
avoid the tragedy.  (Ostrom 1990)  Whether any particular group succeeds depends on the 
presence of favorable conditions, making cooperation in any specific setting an empirical 
question.  The situation with diffuse groups in other environmental policy settings is 
analogous.  Under favorable conditions they can and do organize and then can influence 
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public decision making.  When diffuse groups do succeed in effectively organizing, the 
most pessimistic predictions of government failure will not be correct.   
 
The common pool resources literature and the literature on social movements 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that individuals can overcome collective 
action problems to pursue environmental objectives and that large, broad-based 
environmental groups can organize to achieve collective goals.  Does this ability carry 
over into the political and regulatory arenas where Stigler and others were so confident 
that concentrated economic interests would necessarily dominate?  The answer is yes, if 
conditions are right.  On the one hand, environmental organizations have never been able 
to compete with the coalitions and organizations representing industries and commercial 
organizations in terms of the financial benefits they can provide for elected officials.  On 
the other hand, if their numbers are large enough, environmental groups have available to 
them effective resources that small groups may lack: votes.  Votes are the basic currency 
of election or re-election, and so the ability of diffuse groups to marshal a significant 
number of votes can be an effective tool for advancing interests in the political arena, and 
have the potential to be more effective than the ability to marshal financial resources, 
which may not be convertible into that currency.  A model developed by Arthur Denzau 
and Michael Munger (1986) demonstrates the point.  Their model contains three actors, 
all of them rational, self-interest maximizers — legislators seeking to maximize re-
election votes and who can supply public policy, organized interest groups who have no 
votes but can supply campaign resources, and individuals who cannot supply campaign 
resources but who do have votes.  Denzau and Munger show in straightforward fashion 
that if voters are informed about their preferences and the relation of policy proposals to 
those preferences, interest groups who can supply campaign resources but not votes do 
not influence policy.  In later work, Aidt (1998) even shows that when all relevant 
interest groups are able to compete for public policy, the result of interest group 
competition over environmental policy can be the social welfare maximum, the opposite 
of the result predicted by the Stigler model, all the while maintaining the assumption that 
politicians are motivated by their narrow self-interest.  Aidt’s conditions are not 
ordinarily met, but even when they are not, the introduction of the possibility of broad-
based group action influencing political behavior generates a much larger range of 
possible outcomes, meaning that whether outcomes favor concentrated economic 
interests or broad-based interests depends upon the circumstances.   
 
These and other models demonstrate how it is possible for broad based groups to 
influence policy.  These findings are consistent with the empirical evidence.  In 
reviewing the history of environmental decision making, “what … seems surprising is the 
extent to which environmental advocacy groups have mobilized their constituencies so 
effectively,” in seeming contradiction to some interpretations of Olsonian theory.  (Oates 
and Portney 2003, p. 336)  It is impossible to explain the origins of the many stringent 
environmental regulations that governments have enacted since 1969 without 
incorporating the influence of the preferences of environmentally concerned citizens.  
The statutes enacted by the Congress in the period between 1969 and 1975 have their 
flaws, but they were serious efforts to reduce environmental externalities and they 
imposed significant costs on powerful industries.  In an early effort to estimate the costs 
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of meeting environmental standards under the laws enacted 1969-75, the Environmental 
Protection Agency estimated that the country was then spending about 2.1% of GNP 
complying with environmental regulations.  (U.S. EPA 1990).  Even single policy 
initiatives, like the program to reduce acid deposition by reducing sulfur dioxide 
emissions from electric utility companies, carried hefty cost estimates.  In the acid 
deposition case, compliance cost estimates were $4 to $5 billion per year.  (Cook and 
Miller 1996).  Such statutes are not the product of a political process that is being 
effectively dominated by the industries subject to these new and costly standards.  
Plausible explanations need to incorporate a role for the influence of broad-based 
concerns that environmental contaminants be substantially reduced.  
 
Efforts have been made to model situations in which industry itself might 
advocate for regulations that imposes costs on itself, but they are not successful in 
identifying actual situations in which such advocacy has actually occurred.  For instance, 
Maloney and McCormick (1982) identify conditions under which imposing 
environmental standards on firms can cause profits to go up.  The standards must be 
imposed in a manner that restricts entry, effectively cartelizing the industry; without this 
condition, other firms would see the supra-normal profits and enter, gradually returning 
profits to their pre-standards level.  They must also not be too strict.  To test whether such 
profit improvement can actually occur in practice as a result of environmental standards, 
Maloney and McCormick examined the effect of OSHA’s cotton dust standards on firm 
profits.  They found that the stock market traded value of some firms affected by the 
standards increased after OSHA’s standards were upheld by the Supreme Court.  From 
this single instance, they draw the conclusion that “many of the existing laws and 
institutions [imposing environmental restrictions] can be explained as devices for 
distributing rents created by regulation.” (Maloney and McCormick 1982, p. 121; see 
also Stavins 2004, p. 11).  This conclusion has two flaws.  First, it is a mistake to 
extrapolate from a case study to a conclusion about “many” laws and institutions.  More 
importantly, however, the fact that some firms can benefit in the short-term from 
regulations that restrict entry does not explain either the causal mechanisms that produce 
such regulations or the purposes for which they were written, and so can hardly be 
considered an explanation of them.  Environmental regulations nearly always create 
winners and losers, but this includes regulations for which broad-based environmental 
interests – or, in the case of cotton dust, unions – successfully advocate over the 
opposition of industry.  Simply demonstrating that some firms gain ex post does not show 
that those firms demanded the regulation ex ante.  The regulation might have been 
written despite, rather than because of, that gain or the gain might have been a co-benefit 
of the regulation that was otherwise serving the public interest and not a motivating factor 
for it.  In the case of cotton dust, the evidence suggests that the industry consistently 
opposed OSHA’s restrictions throughout the administrative process and that this 
opposition continued afterwards, to the point of the American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute and the National Cotton Council of America taking the legal challenge all the 
way to the Supreme Court in an attempt to overturn them.  Overall, pointing to the 
preferences and lobbying efforts of regulated industries “does not seem … very 
successful as a positive theory of environmental policy.”  (Oates and Portney 2003, p. 
330; Moe 1997, pp. 462-63) 
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While models that posit regulated firm dominance of the decision making process 
do not fare well as general explanations for why stringent environmental laws are 
enacted, the situation is somewhat different when focus shifts the choice that legislatures 
when selecting the regulatory instruments and procedures to be used to enforce those 
laws.  The influence of firm preferences is often a useful explanatory variable for these 
second-order decisions.  For more on this, see Section V(B) below, describing the 
literature on instrument choice.  
 
Another approach to explaining the existence of costly environmental regulations 
depends on the idea of bootlegger and Baptist coalitions – or “unholy alliances,” in 
Ackerman and Hassler’s (1981) terminology -- which unite environmental advocates and 
particular sub groups within industry who stand to gain substantially from environmental 
regulation, such as waste disposal firms.  (Zywicki (2002); Greve and Smith, 1992; 
Yandle 1983)  In such coalitions, each partner may advocate the same or similar action, 
yet each for their own distinct reasons.  Coalition explanations of this type diverge from 
special interest dominance models because they acknowledge the explanatory value of 
including broad-based environmental interests. Oftentimes the “bootlegger” element of 
the coalition is a less substantial industry or sub-industry component than the industry 
component that stands to lose from the regulation, suggesting that if the contest simply 
pitted the two industrial interests against each other, the bootlegger element might well 
not prevail. A number of case studies have explored instances in which coalitions of 
industry and environmentalists may explain government decisions.  Brandt and Svendsen 
(2004), for instance, argue that manufacturers of equipment for wind energy, where 
European firms dominate, help explain why the EU was willing to commit to the Kyoto 
limits on greenhouse gases even after the United States had defected from the agreement.  
Earlier Lamm and Yasinow (1969) revealed how the billboard industry combined with 
environmental interests in successfully advocating for the Federal Highway 
Beautification Act.  See also the case studies in Greve and Smith (1992). 
 
Once the possibility that broad-based interests can effectively influence decisions 
is incorporated into public choice modeling, a wide range of results becomes possible 
when governments are making environmental decisions.  The outcome of environmental 
policy ceases to be predictably favorable to concentrated economic interests and 
unfavorable to broad-based interests, and becomes a process in which different interests 
interact, with the balance of influence shifting according to their strength, the institutional 
structure of the public choice being made and other factors.  The foundational period of 
federal environmental policy making in the 1969-1975 period constituted a period in 
which mass movement dynamics made environmental interests particularly influential, 
with elected officials eager to respond to the broad based clamor for aggressive action to 
ameliorate environmental problems.  (Bryner 2008, pp. 320-322)    
 
B.  Preferences and Motives:  The De Gustibus Principle 
 
Recognizing that broad based, diffuse groups can effectively mobilize to 
influence policy decisions improves the quality of public choice modeling of 
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environmental policy.  But what explains the ability of such groups to overcome 
collective action obstacles?  In addition to shedding light on a question important in its 
own right, the general explanation of how groups of citizens are able to organize also has 
implications for a more realistic explanation of the behavior of public officials as well. 
 
Initially, public choice contended that the public interest approach to government 
decision making errs by assuming that a different set of assumptions regarding individual 
behavior should be used when modeling public decisions than neoclassical economics 
successfully uses in modeling private markets.  Having expressed skepticism regarding 
the assumption that officials will be public-minded, however, the early efforts of public 
choice to explain decisions by government actors made the opposite error by assuming 
that they never will be.  Neither position can be squared with market theory’s approach 
toward market actors.  Under the de gustibus principle, market theory makes no 
assumption about the content of individual preferences, relying instead on revealed 
preferences to disclose that information.  By not consistently maintaining the de gustibus 
principle, early public choice contributions did not live up to their own critique.  Satz and 
Ferejohn refer to a conception of rationality that imposes no restrictions on substantive 
preferences as “thin” to distinguish it from “thick” accounts that do place such 
restrictions.  (Satz & Ferejohn 1994).  Many of the early public choice theories of 
government decision making, such a Stigler’s economic theory of regulation, Niskanen’s 
theory of bureaucracy, as well as others, are thick accounts:  they posit that the relevant 
political actors will pursue their material self-interest.     
 
 In order to be consistent with market theory’s assumptions, thin rationality 
accounts of government decision making appropriately make no a priori assumptions 
regarding the preferences of public actors.  Instead, they concentrate on revealed 
preferences, taking the question of preferences to be an empirical one.  Models that 
assume preferences are limited to material self-interest can sometimes be helpful as a first 
approximation, but whether this is so needs to be verified empirically, not assumed a 
priori.  Oftentimes, observed behavior shows that people’s preferences are a good deal 
more complex. The thick account of rationality has great difficulty explaining the 
existence of large group citizen activity that promotes greater environmental quality, for 
example.  To explain such activity, students of large group collective action of the kind 
experienced in such fields as civil rights and the environment typically find three types of 
preferences or benefits that individuals may be furthering when they participate in 
collective action, only one of which is material.  Beyond material benefits, individuals 
can obtain both solidary benefits and purposive or expressive benefits from participation 
in collective action.  (Loomis and Cigler 2007, pp. 9-10)  The possibility that these 
benefits can flow from collective action implies that broad-based action is possible even 
when the positive contribution that any individual can make to achieving material 
benefits is small and participation is costly. 
 
The decision to participate in collective action can be modeled as R = pb – c + d, 
where R equals the reward from participation, b equals the material benefits that an 
individual will gain if the collective action is successful, p equals the probability that the 
individual’s participation will be decisive in gaining that collective benefit, c and d equal 
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the costs and benefits of participating, respectively.  Participation is warranted when R is 
positive. Assuming that the only benefits that accrue to an individual are material ones 
amounts to setting d equal to zero.  Doing so generates the conclusion that large diffuse 
groups will seldom be able to organize, because the prospects of pb exceeding c when 
individual material benefits are small and the group is large are unlikely.  When the d-
term – which incorporates solidary and purposive benefits -- is positive, however, then R 
can also be positive, and an individual’s choice to participate in large group activity 
likewise becomes rationally explicable. (Schroeder 1998) Analysts have identified further 
features of collective action situations that can have a significant effect on participation 
rates.  For instance, the participation decision can be influenced by the amount of trust 
individuals have toward others in their group, because trust increases an individual’s 
confidence that others will also participate if they do, increasing the value of p.  (Lubell 
2002).   
 
Incorporating purposive and solidary benefits into the study of large group 
behavior has become widely accepted in the literature, although we do not yet have a 
thorough understanding of the conditions under which these benefits together with 
considerations of trust and other possible influences on the collective action decision 
contribute enough to the perceived benefits of participation that they are able to 
overcome the costs.  Even without having a complete explanation of how groups form 
and act effectively, studies regularly find evidence of the influence of such mobilization 
on environmental decisions.  Hamilton and Viscusi (1999, pp. 145-47), for instance, find 
correlations between stricter clean ups at hazardous waste sites and measures of citizen 
mobilization such as higher voter turnout and higher per capita membership in 
environmental groups.  Similarly, Daley (2007) finds that the participation of citizen 
advisory groups in the development of clean up standards for hazardous waste sites has a 
statistically significant correlation to selection of more health-protective remedies at such 
sites.  Other studies have found the presence of environmental organizations affects 
environmental enforcement activity.  (Davis & Davis 1999, Helland 1998c, Hamilton 
1996). In a case study, Bernauer and Caduff (2004) test the hypothesis that NGOs can 
effectively translate public concerns into regulatory policy, defeating producer or 
industrial interests.  They document the influence of NGOs in setting European policy 
toward the use of growth hormones in meat. (The EU banned growth hormones, over the 
objections of local and international beef producers.  Subsequently, the World Trade 
Organization ruled that the ban was an impermissible trade barrier because it lacked a 
sufficient scientific basis.)  Applying a times-series regression analysis to United 
Nations’ Global Environmental System monitoring data from 1977 to 1988, Binder and 
Neumayer (2005) find that the strength of environmental NGOs has a statistically 
significant impact on the strength of country controls on sulfur dioxide, smoke and heavy 
particulates.  They identify a number of causal mechanisms that may explain the 
influence of NGOs, including their ability to convince policymakers that their political 
support from its members and the larger public will increase as a result of supporting 
more protective pollution standards.   
 
The results of individual studies such as these are difficult to generalize.  They 
neither establish that large groups will regularly be able to overcome collective action 
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barriers nor that when they do they will prevail against producer or industrial interests.  
They are, however, telling counter-examples against the claim of effective dominance by 
producer or industrial interests and they provide ample justification for modeling 
environmental policy decisions in ways that incorporate the possibilities that diffuse 
groups can organize and, when they do, sometimes prevail against opposing interests.   
Thinning out the notion of rationality by admitting the possibility of solidary and 
purposive benefits improves the ability of public choice to describe observed behavior, 
producing better models that can generate better predictions.  Normative or prescriptive 
judgments about government’s appropriate role in addressing environmental problems 
will then be founded on more reliable estimates of the consequences of assigning various 
decisions to government.   
 
If the activity of large-group organizations helps substantiate the impact of 
solidary and purposive benefits among citizens, similar non-material benefits may be 
accruing to other participants in public decisions in ways that ought not to be ignored.  In 
fact, modeling of the behavior of elected officials and bureaucrats also improves if the 
possibility of their having non-material preferences is acknowledged.  In an important 
early study, Kalt and Zupan (1984) analyzed the voting patterns of Senators during the 
period 1977-78 when twenty-one separate votes on the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act were taken, due to President Ford vetoing the measure twice before 
President Carter signed it.  Employing an econometric model, they find that including in 
the model’s specification the Senator’s “ideology” – their “ideas about how government 
can best serve” their “conception of the public interest,” id. p. 281 -- significantly 
increased the model’s ability to predict how a Senator will vote.  In a study aimed 
primarily at determining whether Senators vote to protect their states from the costs of 
environmental compliance, Hussain and Laband (2005) examined roll call votes on 
environmental legislation from 1991-2002.  They found that pro-environment ideology 
significantly increased the probability of a pro-environment vote, while the prospect of 
the senator’s state being adversely affected relative to other states decreased that 
probability.   In a study of Senate and House votes on the Superfund legislation, Hird 
(1994) tested the influence of member’s ideological commitments to environmental 
protection compared to the prospects for returning net financial benefits to their districts 
or states.  While finding evidence of programmatic pork in Superfund voting behavior, in 
both House and Senate voting Hird also found that ideological positions had greater 
explanatory power.  
 
More generally, the best models of legislative behavior do not restrict the factors 
that influence them to ones that advance a legislator’s material interests.  Instead, they 
acknowledge “a constellation of factors made possible by being a legislator: making 
public policy, doing good things for the country or for the district, satisfying ideological 
beliefs, having prestige and the prerequisites of the office and so on.” (Keohane, Revesz 
and Stavins 1999, p. 95; see also (Farber & Frickey 1991, p. 33)   Contextual features 
will determine how an individual legislator can maximize the overall benefits he or she 
receives from all of these contributing factors, including such circumstances as the type 
of decision being made, its visibility and the distribution of observable costs and benefits.  
Sometimes this may mean supplying public policy that narrow economic interests want, 
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but at other times it will be achieved by serving one’s constituents or by acting to 
advance principled commitments, including commitments to the general welfare.    
 
Studies show that bureaucrats as well as elected officials are influenced by a 
larger set of factors than a thick rationality account recognizes.  In a multi-variate 
econometric study of decisions by the EPA to cancel uses of registered pesticides over 
the period 1972-1987, for instance, Maureen Cropper and colleagues found that 
cancellation decisions were significantly influenced by balancing health risks against the 
economic value of continued use. While this result might be interpreted as the EPA 
simply engaging in a trade off between the selfish concerns of  different special interest 
groups, Cropper and her colleagues found evidence that EPA was performing an informal 
cost-benefit analysis of the general kind considered necessary by economists in order to 
produce sensible regulations.  (Cropper, et al. 1992). The study concluded that “it appears 
that EPA is indeed capable of making the kind of balancing decisions that economists 
presumably support and that FIFRA clearly requires.” Id. p. 193. While the specific 
results may well deviate some from those that market theory’s welfare maximization goal 
would recommend, they also suggest that the choices made reflect an appreciation of both 
the general welfare gains that reduced exposure to pesticides can achieve as well as the 
concerns of producers.   Other studies have produced similar results.  When Hird (1990) 
studied expenditures at Superfund sites, he found that the site’s hazard risk ranking – a 
measure of the amount of public health risk associated with the site -- was the most 
significant factor influencing site specific spending, with the preferences of legislators 
playing a lesser role.  Likewise, in a study of decisions made by the Interior Department 
on the sale of leases for offshore drilling, Hoagland and Farrow (1996) found of legislator 
and interest group priorities influenced outcomes, but so did the expected net social value 
of each lease.      
 
Such studies move away from thick accounts of rationality to ones that 
accommodate a richer set of arguments in the objective function of public officials.  In 
doing so, they lose some of the tractability of modeling that come with thick accounts, 
because it typically is easier to determine what choice will improve material well being 
than it is when using thinner accounts, where assessing the comparative ability of 
different choices to advance a more complex menu of influencing factors is more 
difficult, especially when some of these influences are intangible and unobservable.  One 
way that analysts accommodate the greater complexity of the thin rationality assumption 
is to employ reduced-form analyses in which a number of different possible influencing 
factors can be represented as independent variables in empirical studies of decision 
making.  The research objective then is to test the significance of each factor, rather than 
specifying a formal public choice model.  A variety of interesting findings have emerged 
from such studies, amply demonstrating that decision makers respond to multiple 
influences.  In a study of decisions by the Fish and Wildlife Service with respect to 
endangered species, Metrick and Weitzman (1996) tested whether agency decisions are 
affected by “scientific” characteristics of species, such as empirical evidence of their 
threatened or endangered status, or by “visceral” characteristics, such as whether the 
species involved are perceived in emotionally favorable ways.  They found significant 
influence of visceral factors, with decisions favoring visually attractive species, like the 
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spotted owl, or familiar mammals, like grizzly bears.  They also found that different types 
of decisions are differentially influenced by these factors.  Scientific considerations seem 
to play a heavier role in the initial listing decisions, for instance, than they do in the 
decisions about how much money to spend on protective actions, where visceral factors 
predominate.  They find evidence that conflicts with development projects also have a 
bearing on agency outcomes. 
 
Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) analyzed the records of decision at Superfund sites 
in order to understand what factors affected decisions regarding the stringency of clean 
up at those site.  Using voter turnout, membership in environmental organizations and the 
environmental advocacy ratings of the state’s senators as proxies for collective action by 
concerned citizens, they found “that the likelihood that residents will engage in collective 
action does cause regulators to adopt more stringent cleanup standards and spend more to 
avert cancer cases.”  Id., p. 154.  Because more stringent clean up often imposed costs 
greater than could be justified by the expected monetary value of the anticipated health 
benefits, the influence of citizen collective action seems to push regulators away from 
decisions likely to maximize social welfare judged by willingness to pay.  Hamilton and 
Viscusi also suggest an interesting implication for advocates of environmental justice:  
because low income communities tend to be less politically active, decisions that are less 
responsive to local community organization and more responsive to formal cost-benefit 
analysis may actually improve outcomes from an environmental justice perspective.  On 
the other hand, Daley’s work, cited earlier, suggests the alternative hypothesis that 
greater use of community advocacy groups in low income community may improve the 
responsiveness of clean up decisions to their concerns.  (Daley 2007). 
 
The interplay of interest group priorities and other preferences of agency officials 
can be complex, sometimes due to the number of interest groups reflecting different 
priorities that have a stake in an outcome.  For instance, Martin et al. (1996) identified 
seven distinct interest groups with a stake in oil and gas leasing on federals lands:  the oil 
company, local organizations representing environmental, tourist, timber, retail and 
wholesale concerns, local government and the agency itself.  Regulatory actions typically 
involve a large number of discrete decisions, and it is plausible that different interest 
groups may have greater influence at different points in the process.  In a study of the use 
of environmental taxes in Europe, for instance, Ekins and Speck (1999) identified a 
number of specific exemptions or other forms of tax relief benefiting different sectors of 
the economy.  Similar targeted benefits, this time in the form of bonus allowances, were 
included in the legislation establishing the acid rain control program in the United States. 
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1998)   
 
One particular potential influence on agency behavior that has received much 
attention is that of the legislature.  Here, as is the case with the study of bureaucratic 
behavior more generally, principal-agent models have become the standard.  (Wood and 
Waterman 1994, Davis and Davis 1999)  Among the principal concerns here has been to 
determine what influences bureaucratic behavior.  One possibility is that agencies follow 
the decision rules of the statutes under which they operate.  Another possible influence 
comes from the preferences of current legislators who exercise oversight authority and 
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control the size of an agency’s budget through annual appropriations.  Presidents, too, 
have a strong interest in directing the bureaucracy and likewise have several tools 
available to them, primarily the power to appoint agency leadership as well as centralized 
oversight through the Office of Management and Budget that all Presidents since Nixon 
have exercised.  Interest group influence, either indirectly through the legislature or the 
President, or directly by providing benefits to agency officials, of course must also be 
considered.   
 
Wood and Waterman examined the influence of congressional and presidential 
preferences by using a number of different tests to examine how agencies responded to 
preference changes in the Congress and the Presidency.  Examining different agencies 
and political circumstances, they regularly found changes in agency behavior 
corresponding to changes in the political branches, suggesting that the one was 
responsive to the other.  At the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, when Congress 
expressed anxiety about nuclear safety by enacting legislation in 1980, enforcement 
actions by the agency increased, but they then decreased after President Reagan replaced 
President Carter, bringing with him a deregulatory philosophy as well as strong support 
for commercial use of nuclear power.  (Wood and Waterman 1994, pp. 49-50)  During 
the same time period during the Reagan administration, inspections and product seizures 
at the Food and Drug Administration also declined. Id., pp. 52-57.  Similarly, the number 
of auto defect engineering inspections at the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration fell early in the Reagan administration, id., pp. 59-61, as did the number 
of violation notices issued by the Office of Surface Mining, id. pp. 62-64.  
 
These changes occurred while the Congress, which remained in democratic hands, 
was much more pro-enforcement than the President, thus suggesting presidential 
dominance.  On the other hand, enforcement of the hazardous waste laws increased 
during the Reagan administration, when Reagan’s control of the agency was weakened 
by scandals involving the EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch Burford and Rita Lavelle, 
the hazardous waste administrator, enabling Congress to gain an upper hand.  In a test of 
the relative influence of the Congress that enacted legislation compared to the current 
Congress, DeShazo and Freeman (2003) looked at the determinants of Fish and Wildlife 
Service decisions either listing subspecies or setting the funding allocated to their 
recovery.  They found the preferences of the members of the appropriations and oversight 
committees of the current Congress had statistically significant effects on those decisions, 
while the influence of the factors written into the statute was statistically insignificant. 
See also Rawls and Laband (2004)   Beyond the studies already noted, a number of others 
have examined the bureaucratic decisions that are often critical in determining how 
statutory standards will actually be applied with respect to Superfund (Gupta, et al. 
1996)), toxic substances (Van Houtven and Cropper 1996), the endangered species 
program (Simon et al, 1995) and leaking underground storage tanks (Berrens et al. 1999).  
 
The principal-agent framework has been employed by a large and growing 
literature examining the determinants of the decisions of agencies implementing 
environmental policy.  The context-dependent nature of these analyses again prevents 
broad generalizations about the comparative role of interest groups and the ideological or 
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other non-material preferences of public officials, except to say that an emerging theme 
of this work is that both matter.  The earlier work that posited dominance of concentrated 
economic interests was not wrong to conclude that those interests influenced public 
decisions.  Its error was in neglecting to consider the significant role played by a much 
larger range of interests, including broad-based environmental interests, as well as the 
role played by ideological and other non-material preferences.   
 
 
V. Environmental Federalism and Instrument Choice 
 
This section examines the literature on environmental federalism and regulatory 
instrument choice, the last two of the four questions identified at the beginning of the 
prior section.   Once again, theoretical and empirical contributions as well as normative 
implications receive attention. 
 
A.  Environmental Federalism 
 
Within the United States, government responses to environmental problems could 
occur at the federal, state, regional or local levels, as well as at multi-national or even 
global levels.  The variation of environmental problems will determine what level or 
combination of levels can most sensibly respond; there is no universally correct solution 
to how responsibility should be allocated among them.  Appropriate and sufficient 
responses to global warming require global or at least multi-national responses; 
appropriate and sufficient responses to congestion on city streets can often be made by 
local or regional government.  There is a body of thought within economics generally 
advocating that responsibility be assigned to the lowest level of government that still 
encompasses the vast preponderance of both the effects of the environmental externalities 
and the sources of those externalities.  That governmental unit is capable of fully 
appreciating the competing costs and benefits associated with the externality, and it can 
then balance them by taking into account the preferences of those citizens who are 
adversely affected by the externality as well as of those whose activities are producing 
the harm.  It is straightforward to show that such government responses can produce 
greater social benefits than a one-size-fits-all approach established at a higher level of 
government, while responses at a lower level of government will fail to internalize all the 
relevant costs and benefits.  So when the causes and effects of environmental problems 
are localized, the preference from the perspective of allocative efficiency is to assign 
regulatory responsibility to a local rather than a national level of government. 
 
Many environmental problems are not localized.  For just one example, much air 
pollution has a spatial reach that extends for hundreds of miles, even around the globe.  A 
non-negligible amount of the mercury emissions that falls on United States territory can 
be traced to Chinese power plants, for instance, and the effect of greenhouse gas 
emissions from any locality eventually affects the entire planet.  These spillover effects 
prevent any local government from being able to encompass the problem, and the 
presence of spillovers weakens the case for assigning responsibility to lower levels of 
government, out of concern that they will disregard negative spillovers into other 
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jurisdictions.  Empirical work tends to substantiate this, by showing that states seem to 
enforce laws less stringently against firms located near borders with other states.  
(Helland and Whitford 2003).  Even granting the need for national treatment of 
spillovers, however, a common criticism of American environmental policy is that it has 
federalized too many environmental decisions, and thereby falls short of achieving the 
allocative efficiencies of a more decentralized approach.   
 
Often times, advocates of nationalizing environmental regulation buttress the 
spillover-based argument for national standards with one that has even broader 
applications.  They often argue that even the regulation of local problems – problems that 
from an efficiency perspective could to be handled at a lower level of government -- 
ought to be federalized in order to save local jurisdictions from the destructive effects of 
a “race to the bottom.”  The claim is that when local jurisdictions are left to make 
environmental regulatory decisions, the demands on local jurisdictions to compete with 
other jurisdictions for capital by offering lax environmental standards will undermine 
environmental protections.   
 
The race to the bottom thesis has generated an enormous literature, especially if 
one includes the general literature on inter jurisdictional competition that is not limited to 
environmental regulatory matters. For reviews, see Oates (2002), Wellisch (2000), 
Wilson (1996).  Initially, it is worth remarking on the nature of the literature that the 
thesis has generated.  It might be thought that the excessive federalization of 
environmental standards that from an efficiency perspective ought to be handled locally 
would be framed as a flagrant instance of government failure, and therefore that it would 
produce a body of work developing and testing models to explain why this particular 
failure emerges from the self-interest of concentrated economic forces, national 
legislators, bureaucrats and other relevant actors.  Some work in this rein has been done.  
It has been plausibly suggested, for instance, that national industries prefer the economies 
of lobbying for and coping with a single standard setter rather than with fifty or more 
different state standards.  Yandle (1999).  Then, too, bootlegger and Baptist explanations 
that incorporate the influence of environmental organizations have also been advanced.  
On this account, the reasons that environmental organizations prefer national standards 
include lower costs of influencing and monitoring federal actions and the greater 
membership marketing opportunities associated with the more visible role environmental 
organizations play in national rules compared to state or local ones.  Farber (1992), 
Yandle (1999). 
 
Overall, however, the search for public choice explanations for federalization-as-
government-failure has played a relatively minor role in the literature compared to 
theoretical examinations of whether the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is itself a plausible 
description of how competing states would behave if regulation were left up to them. 
Perhaps the reason this question has received so much attention is that until it is resolved, 
it cannot be decided whether existing levels of federalization are government failures or 
not.  If race-to-the-bottom is correct, then assigning regulation to either level of 
government would be sub-optimal, and it would be a matter of trying to determine which 
deviated more from the welfare-maximizing solution.  Consequently, scholars of public 
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choice have vigorously debated whether competition among environmental standard-
setting jurisdictions produces a race to the bottom, a race to the top, the selection of 
welfare-maximizing optimal standards, or something else.   
 
Oates and Schwab have produced the most prominent theoretical model of 
competition among local jurisdictions with respect to environmental problems that lack 
significant spillover effects. (Oates and Schwab 1988).  Their model identifies the 
conditions under which local government would establish standards at socially optimal 
levels, rather than engaging in a race to the bottom.   Individual citizens are assumed to 
be both consumers trying to maximize their entire package of goods and services, as well 
as workers who provide labor for industry.  Capital is assumed to be mobile, while labor 
is immobile.  Production activity varies with the stringency of the emissions standards, 
and production determines labor rates, so allowable emissions are proportional to labor 
rates.  Oates and Schwab use a median voter model to describe government standard 
setting, in which government chooses the standard that maximizes the preferences of the 
median voter.  Under these conditions, they show that the median voter (who is also the 
representative citizen because the population is homogeneous) will prefer a standard that 
maximizes the combination of the environmental quality benefits and the wage benefits 
she receives, and hence this is the standard that government delivers.  Each citizen will 
receive the amount of environmental quality that they are willing to pay for via foregone 
wages.  This is the socially optimal level of regulation.  Since Oates and Schwab, models 
addressing both domestic and international situations, have proliferated. (Esty and 
Geradin 1997; Barrett 1994; Wilson 1996).   
 
Models like Oates and Schwab’s have been relied upon by critics of the 
federalization of environmental standards, who infer from them that the worry about 
overly lax standards being set by local governments is overdrawn, and hence that the 
decisions to federalize local environmental problems is a further instance of government 
failure after all.  (Revesz 1992, Revesz 2001, Adler 2005b).  The conditions required for 
the socially optimal result are restrictive, however, similar to those required by Aidt’s 
(1998) model for when interest group interactions result in socially optimal regulation.  
When they are not met, theory predicts that results will deviate from the ideal.  Some 
deviations produce regulation that is too lax from an efficiency perspective while others 
in regulation that is too strict.  As an example of the latter, if citizens exhibit the NIMBY 
response to polluting industries, standards are set too high.  (Levinson 1999, Glazer 
1999).  Some scholars consider the NIMBY danger –in which localities enact 
environmental standards that are too strict, in order to prevent undesirable facilities from 
locating in them – to be at least as great a worry as the race to the bottom.  (Adler 2005b).  
On the other hand, when political decision makers fear capital flight, lowering 
environmental standards can be used as a strategic tool to attract and retain capital, in 
which case standards may be set too low.  (Oates 2002).  Generally, when regulators react 
strategically to decision made in other jurisdictions, the results vary according to the 
preferences of the actors and their incentives, with no universal result, and empirical 
findings in particular settings must be interpreted carefully.    
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The empirical literature on the race-to-the-bottom issue is thinner than the 
theoretical literature, although it is growing.  Before looking at it, however, several 
features of the theoretical debate are worth noting.  When skeptics of the race to the 
bottom hypothesis rely on model like those of Oates and Schwab, they are relying upon a 
prediction of local government being relatively successful compared to higher levels of 
government.  Describing a world in which some governments can succeed while others 
fail is a remarkably more nuanced picture than the bleak one generated by the early 
interest group models.  In fact, the respective approaches to modeling could not differ 
more.  Instead of assuming the dominance of economically powerful interest groups as in 
an interest group model, median voter models of the kind employed by Oates and 
Schwab assume that government is responsive to the preferences of the general 
population. Under the Oates and Schwab model, for instance, a local government reaches 
a welfare-maximizing decision because the median voter prefers a policy where the 
marginal monetary benefits she gains from increased environmental quality and increased 
wages are equal, and that translates to the socially optimal result.   
 
It also follows from the Oates and Schwab model that if the median voter prefers 
economic growth to improved environmental quality, government will adopt lower 
standards, and visa versa.  In other words, government is responsive to majority 
preferences, as democratic theory urges that it ought to be.  (Oates and Schwab 1988, pp. 
345-349).  At the same time, either of those results – higher or lower standards than is 
socially optimal from a willingness to pay perspective --  would deviate from the 
allocatively efficient outcome, which would seem to mean that from the public choice 
perspective each would be an instance of government failure.  That is an odd conclusion 
to reach regarding decisions that reflect majority preferences.  As such, the conclusion 
ought to warn of a problem with the standard public choice conception of government 
failure that can go unnoticed: even though public choice seeks to explain how 
government makes decisions by translating preferences into outcomes, its normative 
baseline exists completely independently of whether it corresponds to anyone’s 
preferences.  Many normative accounts of democracy, on the other hand, place great 
weight on whether outcomes are responsive to majority preferences.  Of course, majority 
decisions are not immune from criticism on normative grounds, and as a constitutional 
democracy the United States is committed on placing limits on unfettered 
majoritarianism.  At the same, within a broad range of policy making discretion, 
decisions that reflect the will of the majority possess an enormously powerful democratic 
pedigree, and are hardly considered instances of government failure simply because they 
are not welfare-maximizing.  Public choice theory fails to distinguish between decisions 
diverging from a social welfare maximum, based on willingness to pay, that are due to 
special interest group influence versus those due to a majority’s preference for some 
other choice.  This may well be a reason to be somewhat skeptical of public choice’s 
definition of government failure. 
 
Even decisions that diverge from both the majority will and the welfare-
maximizing result cannot be automatically written off as government failures.  Majority 
will can be driven by passions and prejudices, as well as by rational ignorance.  One of 
the most challenging tasks of elected representatives is to mediate the gap that can exist 
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between what is perceived to be majority will and the representative’s own understanding 
of what is best for the country.   Resolving the tension between the two raises the classic 
Burkean dilemma, requiring an act of judgment on the part of each representative, one 
that not infrequently results in a decision embodying neither a complete endorsement of 
the perceived majority will nor a complete expression of the representative’s individual 
commitments.  The resulting government decisions can thus end up deviating both from 
the popular will of the moment and from the outcome that the representative thinks to be 
best public decision.  Such a result, however, may well the just the kind of compromise 
that democracies often end up making, and that are thought essential to responsible 
governing.   
 
Lastly, another complexity is added by the fact that there is no justification within 
the premises of public choice theory itself to insist that either citizens or their 
representatives adopt welfare-maximization as the sole legitimate objective for public 
decisions to pursue.   Once the thick rationality view of material self-interest is dropped 
in favor of a thin rationality account consistent with the de gustibus principle, public 
choice’s agnosticism toward individual preferences should extend to individual 
preferences about public decisions and values as well as their preferences about private 
ones.  Accordingly, public choice cannot deny the possibility of individuals preferring 
their government to pursue multiple goals, of which welfare-maximization may be just 
one.  After all, market theorists do not deny that society can legitimately pursue 
distributional goals, or justice-related ones, or others.  Their preference for reserving 
market regulatory measures to those that improve efficiency and for using other 
mechanisms to pursue other objectives is a preference that is itself rooted based on an 
efficiency concern.  Individuals whose value system ranks values differently will be 
inclined to approach regulatory decisions differently, giving greater priority to other 
values.  
 
For these and other reasons, the relationship between decisions that diverge from 
welfare-maximization on the one hand and government failure on the other much more 
fraught with ambiguity than public choice regularly acknowledges. The case of local 
government following the preferences of the median voter by adopting a welfare-
maximizing environmental standard is a relatively easy one to see as a government 
success story, and the case of government following the materially self-interested 
preferences of a narrow industrial sector to reach a result that is heavily welfare-reducing 
is an easy one to condemn.  Ceteris paribus, the first combines the attractive features of 
both majority responsiveness and a certain substantive appeal while the second is doubly 
unattractive.  When cases do not fit these extremes, however, the judgment will be more 
contestable.  Decisions may be only partially responsive to majority will and they may be 
subject to criticism on some substantive grounds while praiseworthy on others.  The fact 
that a particular decision diverges from the single-minded goal of welfare-maximization 
seems insufficient by itself to put it automatically in the same category as the welfare-
reducing, special-interest benefiting decision.  The divergence might reflect a difference 
of opinion about the goals of government and how to prioritize them when they conflict, 
or a compromise between majority responsiveness and principled commitment. 
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As an illustration of how various legitimate considerations can affect 
environmental decision making, consider the environmental federalism question itself.  
Assigning government decisions to the lower rather than higher levels of government can 
be defended for reasons quite independent of comparative abilities to make welfare-
maximizing decisions.  The principle of subsidiarity in the European Union, for instance, 
establishes a presumption of decentralization in order to recognize the significant 
autonomy of member states.  Subsidiarity permits member countries to enact laws that 
take into account their own cultural norms, legal traditions and other social factors 
distinctive to individual countries.  Whether or not subsidiarity is welfare-maximizing, a 
separate case can be made for the principle on these grounds.  Therefore, even if race-to-
the-bottom problems could be convincingly shown, the conclusion that continuing to 
abide by the principle of subsidiarity constitutes government failure would surely be 
contestable.  It might be the case that the competing values of maximizing welfare and 
maintaining local autonomy had been appropriately balanced by a responsible 
government.    
 
In sum, government decisions can be evaluated for their welfare enhancing 
properties and criticized when they fall short.  As the discipline of public choice becomes 
more consistent with its own fundamental premises, however, it becomes increasingly 
problematic to affix the label of government failure solely on that basis.  Empirical 
results in public choice confirm a more nuanced description of the preferences that go 
into public decisions, finding that the relevant actors are frequently influenced by a mix 
of motives, including but not limited to the general welfare measured by willingness to 
pay.  Decisions may often not correspond precisely to what the single minded pursuit of 
welfare-maximization would recommend, but if these decisions reflect other values that 
members of society hold, and if those values cannot be rejected on normative grounds, 
then they are not appropriately labeled government failures for that reason alone.  In this 
respect, public choice’s normative implications have evolved at the same time as its 
descriptive methods have.   
 
What do the empirical results say about the race to the bottom?   The empirical 
studies are less numerous than the elaborate theoretical debate, and no clear pattern has 
emerged.  Overall, however, the evidence of races to the bottom is not compelling.  Engel 
(1997) and Saleska and Engel (1998) surveyed state regulators and concluded that 
regulators were generally aware of the standards set by other jurisdictions.  They also 
examined whether standards were lower when regulators reported that they were 
concerned about businesses leaving the jurisdiction, and found that they were.  Relying 
on other studies suggesting that environmental standards do not generally influence 
location decisions by industry, they concluded that lowering standards to keep industry 
when it was not going to move in any event was evidence of unnecessarily lax local 
standard setting.  Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) similarly found evidence that state 
regulators are aware of the regulatory standards of other jurisdictions.  Using industry-
adjusted data on relative state environmental abatement costs and unadjusted pollution 
and control expenditures per dollar of manufacturing per state – two measures of the 
stringency of environmental regulations – they found a positive correlation between 
stringency of one state’s standards and those of its neighboring states, suggesting that 
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individual regulators make changes to match what their neighbors are doing.  As they 
note, however, strategic interaction need not be destructive; it could be an indication of 
healthy competition.  In this case, they find that “states are responsive to abatement cost 
changes in neighboring states with initially more stringent environmental policy, but we 
detect no significant impact of changes in neighbors with lower abatement costs. … 
[T]his implies that states are being ‘pulled’ toward higher abatement costs by 
improvements in neighbors with already higher abatement costs.”  Id., pp 103-4. 
 
Several papers examine the effect of the devolution of authority under President 
Reagan.  (List and Gerking 2000, Millimet 2003).  The stringency of environmental 
standards is a combined function of the standards, how the standards are implemented by 
an administrative agency and how they are subsequently enforced.  By giving states 
greater autonomy to implement and enforce national standards, President Reagan’s 
devolution policy provided an opportunity for states to compete with each other for 
capital.  Using pollution and abatement control expenditures, both per capita and per unit 
of manufacturing output, as well as nitrogen oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions as 
measures of effective environmental standard stringency, Millimet (2003) examined the 
years 1929-1994.  First, Millimet found that the Reagan year trends were distinguishable 
from both the preceding and following periods.  However, whereas per capita nitrogen 
oxide and sulfur dioxide emissions levels deteriorated in the period preceding the Reagan 
presidency, during his presidency this trend was reversed.  With respect to pollution and 
abatement expenditures, Reagan devolution had no discernible effect in the first term, 
when states were under severe fiscal constraints.  In the late 1980s, however, Millimet’s 
findings continue not to support a race to the bottom, and indicate increasing stringency 
of environmental standards.  List and Gerking’s results were similar.  (List and Gerking 
2000).    
 
Taking a different approach, Revesz (2001) surveyed the period prior to the 
extensive federalization of environmental standards.  He found evidence that state 
standards increased in stringency in a number of different areas, and that states have 
occasionally continued to take action beyond the federal standards even after much 
environmental regulation has been federalized.  In another approach to the question, Paul 
(1994) finds that centralization has not tightened packaging-waste regulation in the EU, 
perhaps due to effective lobbying by industry at the EU level.   
 
The hypothesis that states will race to the bottom rests several underlying 
assumptions.  First, industry makes locational decisions based on the stringency of 
environmental standards.  Second, states understand this and react strategically to 
encourage industry to remain or locate in-state.  State strategies will be determined not so 
much by absolute levels of their standards but by comparing their states to those of other 
states.  We have already discussed some research results indicating that states do take the 
standards that their neighbors are setting into account.  Other studies have examined the 
issue of industrial location decisions and whether they are influenced by environmental 
standards.   
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The results are not consistent.  In a study of plant location decisions, McConnell 
and Schwab (1990) found environmental standards had little influence.  Tobey (1990) 
also found no impact across different countries.  When Jaffe, et. al (1995), p. 157, 
surveyed the entire body of work on this subject, they found little evidence to support the 
claim that stringent environmental regulations have an adverse impact on industrial 
locations. Other work, however, has found identifiable effects of environmental 
regulations on plant location decisions.  Henderson (1996) compared plant decisions to 
locate in attainment areas for ozone versus non-attainment areas for ozone, where 
regulatory standards are stricter, and found a decided preference for the attainment areas.  
List et al. (2003) analyzed the decisions of foreign multinational corporations and found 
that these companies took the stringency of air quality standards into account in making 
location decisions.  Looking at these and other studies, Jeppesen et al. (2002) performed a 
meta-analysis of the results.  They found that the locational effects on foreign companies 
were greater than on domestic ones.  They also found a division in the research, with 
earlier studies finding smaller effects than later ones.  While they could identify 
methodological differences in the two waves of research, they could not isolate within 
them reasons for the differences between them, ultimately concluding that why the 
discrepancy “occurs is not entirely clear.”  Id. at 24. 
 
  
B.  Instrument Choice 
 
Regulators approach environmental problems with an extensive tool kit.  They 
can establish performance standards for pollution sources based on the capabilities of 
abatement technology, or they can set standards for permissible concentrations of 
pollutants in the air, ground or water, for which there are then a variety of ways to 
develop individual source standards so that aggregate emissions will meet the ambient 
standards, or they can define a level of adverse health effects that is not to be exceeded, 
again with a variety of methods for assigning individual responsibilities for controlling 
the pollution associated with those health effects.  Where the standards set numerical 
limits, the legislature can establish them itself, as the Congress does in the case of auto 
emissions, or it can delegate that responsibility to an agency, as in the case of ambient air 
standards, either with or without deadlines for action, and with or without default 
standards that automatically take effect if the agency fails to act.  The legislature can 
instruct the agency to employ a cost-benefit test for any regulation, either as a check 
against performance, ambient or health standards being too stringent or as a direct 
standard setting methodology.  Notwithstanding the diversity of tools available – and this 
summary only touches on some of the variations available – public choice lumps nearly 
all of them under the single label of “command-and-control” to signal their differentiation 
from market correcting or market-based instruments, and perhaps also in the hope that the 
comparison will invoke unhappy memories of failed attempts by government to 
implement planned economies.  Here we will refer to the first group as direct regulatory 
instruments and the second as incentive-based instruments. 
 
Incentive-based instruments also come in different forms, but among the most 
frequently discussed are variant of tax measures on the one hand and tradeable permits on 
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the other, the former building on the work of Pigou (1920) and the latter on the work of 
Dales (1968).  Taxes or fees are “price” instruments.  They set the price and let market 
forces determine the quantity of emissions resulting from that price.  Tradeable permits 
are “quantity” instruments.  They set the total quantity of allowable emissions and permit 
the trading market to determine the price.  Neither approach is necessarily welfare-
maximizing.  To be welfare-maximizing, emissions must settle at the level where the 
marginal costs of further abatement equals its marginal benefits.  Regulators, however, 
typically lack the information to identify that point, and they may not be aiming for it in 
any event.  Still, economists argue that incentive-based instruments are superior to direct 
regulatory instruments because in theory they are the most cost-effective way to achieve 
whatever result is desired, by virtue of the fact that they create incentives for the 
regulated community to minimize the costs of pollution reduction. 
 
Whatever the ultimate amount of reduction in environmental stressors is being 
sought, incentive-based regulatory instruments promise to achieve that objective at the 
smallest social cost.  Early on, market theorists interested in environmental problems 
developed a rich literature building on the seminal work of Pigou, Dales and others 
designing tax, fee or tradeable permit systems for an enormous range of environmental 
problems.  From the very beginning of the modern environmental era that has seen so 
much government involvement in problems of the environment, those theorists have 
advocated incentive-based instruments for their cost-effectiveness property.  Government 
decision makers have been aware of these recommendations for some time.  In the late 
1960s and 1970s, for instance, President Nixon seriously considered employing a carbon 
tax as a central tool in air quality regulation.  And yet decision makers often did not pull 
incentive-based instruments from their regulatory tool kit, preferring instead one of the 
direct regulatory options.    
 
This mismatch between what markets theorists were recommending and what 
governments preferred constitutes the oldest puzzle in public choice’s engagement with 
environmental policy making.  Buchanan and Tullock (1975) offered the earliest public 
choice explanation of the preference for direct regulation over taxes.  They argued that 
businesses prefer direct regulation to taxes because the direct regulation of emissions 
functions as a barrier to entry, giving firms the potential for increased profits that come 
from cartelization.  This is especially true if the direct regulations impose tighter 
regulations on new sources than on existing ones.  Direct regulation will frequently be 
less expensive for firms because a tax attaches to every unit of pollution emitted, even 
after cost-justified abatement technology has been installed, whereas under direct 
regulation, in contrast firms pay only for abatement control technology.  Therefore, firms 
prefer command-and-control over taxes.  Dewees (1983) subsequently refined the 
Buchanan and Tullock analysis by specifying how firm preferences may change from one 
set of circumstances to another.    
 
Other work has extended the study of firm preferences.  Tradeable permits of any 
kind are thought to be less preferred than direct regulation because their costs are similar 
to taxes.  In addition, firms prefer price certainty with respect to their inputs, and 
tradeable permits have the further disadvantage of being price uncertain.  Within the class 
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of tradeable permits, however, the method of distributing allowances matters at great deal 
to firms.  If allowances are distributed without charge based on historical data, such as 
historical emissions levels, often called grandfathering, this serves as an entry barrier for 
new firms while also existing firms to the extent they can sell excess allowances. For a 
review of possible firm preferences, see Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1999), pp. 104-
107.   
 
Buchanan and Tullock’s model of government is similar to Stigler’s in that firm 
preferences are the only ones considered, and government is simply assumed to provide 
what firms want.  When we examined the question of why governments would tackle 
environmental problems by imposing costly measures on firms at all, we saw that such 
firm-dominance models did not square with the observed facts.  With respect to 
instrument choice, however, firm-dominance models have a great initial plausibility, 
because their predictions are generally more consistent with our observations:  direct 
regulation is widespread, emissions taxes are relatively rare and when tradeable permits 
have been employed they almost always have relied upon a grandfathering scheme for 
distribution of all or nearly all of the available allowances.  Nonetheless, we know from 
the earlier discussion that many government decisions are not dominated by narrow 
economic interests.  Environmentally minded individuals can and do organize effectively 
and individuals including elected officials have preferences extending beyond their own 
material self-interest, among them being commitments to public values, including 
promoting the general welfare.  So the treatment of instrument choice ought not simply to 
ignore the possibilities that these influences may be at play here as well.   
 
More recent contributions to the public choice analysis of instrument choice 
incorporate the preferences of environmental organizations, legislatures and bureaucrats.  
The more complex picture that emerges describes the preferences of these other 
participants as often congruent or substantially overlapping those of industry, particularly 
with respect to the preference for direct regulation.  If groups that on other issues may 
oppose one another happen to agree on some basic choices with regard to instruments, 
then the extensive use of those instruments may not be a signal of effective dominance of 
any single constituency.  In this regard, environmental organizations are thought to have 
a number of their own reasons to prefer direct regulation.  These include the 
philosophical or ethical objection that pollution taxes and tradeable permits constitute 
“licenses to pollute,” the concern that taxes and permitting systems may be difficult to 
change in light of new evidence of pollution damage and the concern for toxic hot spots 
that certain incentive-based instruments may produce. In addition, some environmental 
organizations historically have been dominated by lawyers rather than economists, and so 
are less familiar with incentive-based instruments.  That legal-training bias may be shared 
by legislators and their staffs, who are also much more likely to be lawyers than 
economists.  As or more important, taxes are politically difficult for legislatures to 
support, and the visibility of the costs to consumers of taxes on polluting activities may 
be greater, and hence less attractive to politicians, than the more hidden costs of direct 
regulation.  Direct regulation may also provide elected officials greater opportunities to 
influence important implementation decisions.  Agencies may prefer direct regulation 
instruments because of their familiarity, and because such approaches require larger 
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administrative staff than incentive-based instruments do. For a review of the possible 
preferences of environmental groups, legislators and bureaucrats with regard to 
instrument choice, see Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1999), pp. 107-113.   
 
These hypotheses about the preferences of various constituents require 
verification, of course, and few empirical studies of them are available.  Even casual 
observation indicates that they are at best generalizations with exceptions.  For instance, 
one major environmental organization, the Environmental Defense Fund, has been a long 
standing advocate of incentive-based instruments.  In 1989-1990, its support of the 
tradeable permit program through which the acid rain program was implemented was 
significant at the time for breaking with other environmental organizations, and the 
organization has continued to advocate incentive-based measures.  EDF has always had a 
good number of economists on its staff, which may help explain its different view.  In 
addition, this advocacy may help differentiate it from other organizations, giving it 
advantages in a niche of environmental advocacy that is useful in fund-raising.   
 
Empirical studies of instrument choice are sparse.  In one relevant study, 
Hamilton (1997) draws an important distinction between voting on the final bill for 
passage and preliminary votes on subsidiary issues such as instrument choice.  He 
examines a series of votes on the 1985 Superfund amendments.  These involved votes on 
a number of instrument choices, including a provision mandating disclosure of 
information, a tax on chemical and petroleum industries and a provision establishing 
liability for personal injury.  Hamilton finds that broad constituent preferences and 
member ideology had greater effect on the more visible vote for final passage, while the 
influence of concentrated economic interests was greater on the less visible votes on the 
subsidiary issues.  In a similar vein, Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) examine how some 
of the less visible details of allocating initial allowances under the acid rain program were 
significantly influenced by the preferences of special interests.  Ackerman and Hassler’s 
(1981) study of standard setting for coal-burning power plants, a rich case study, further 
illustrates one lesson that comes from the close study of instrument choice:  the devil is in 
the details.  Whereas a preference analysis of a generic policy instrument might predict 
opposition from a particular constituency, the details of the measure may turn opposition 
into support, and vice versa. 
 
Just as the support of a firm with stable preferences for a regulatory instrument 
may vary according to the details of how the instrument is designed, it may be that firm 
evaluations of the same instrument may change over time in ways that affect support.    
This may be part of the explanation for why governments are selecting incentive-based 
instruments with increasing frequency.  Economists still think there are fewer such 
instruments in place than ideal, and find that the ones that have been enacted often have 
cost-effectiveness-impairing defects. (Hahn 1989, Stavins 2003). Nonetheless, the list of 
existing incentive-based programs has been growing steadily, and is now fairly 
impressive.  (Stavins 2003).  Just as important, when governments consider costly new 
regulations, incentive-based measures are increasingly the approach of choice.  In the 
United States, the Environmental Protection Agency has been an especially strong 
advocate of tradeable permit schemes, even before the successful acid rain program was 
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enacted in 1990, and continuing to this day.  Since 1990, all the major programs that EPA 
has implemented to address interstate air pollution problems have included a cap-and-
trade permit program.   Similarly, it seems inevitable that the nation’s approach to 
reducing greenhouse gases will include an incentive-based program.  While the current 
overwhelming favorite in current legislative proposals is a cap-and-trade program, in 
January, 2009, Rex Tillerson, the CEO of Exxon Mobil, publicly endorsed a tax on 
carbon, with an initial rate “somewhere north” of $20/ton, which is about the price that 
carbon allowances are trading for in the EU’s cap-and-trade program for greenhouse 
gases. (Stilson 2009)  
 
The conviction that regulation firms prefer direct regulation over incentive-based 
instruments have long been a staple in the public choice analysis of instrument choice.  If 
those preferences are now shifting, then the public choice analysis of instrument choice 
needs to be substantially rethought.  This is an area that would benefit greatly from 
additional research.  Suggested explanations include greater familiarity with such 
instruments; increased pollution reduction costs, which puts pressure on parties to seek 
cost-effective measures; and a general political shift toward a trust in markets. (Keohane, 
Revesz and Stavins 1997, p. 45)   All of these fall short of fully explaining support by a 
major oil company for the specific instrument of a tax instead of a cap-and-trade program 
with some grandfathering of initial allocation of allowances.  That support is a long way 
from Buchanan and Tullock’s initial prediction.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This review began by outlining some of the interconnections and commonalities 
between market theory’s study of environmental problems and public choice’s study of 
environmental policies.  While the parallelism between the two remains imperfect, the 
developments in public choice reviewed here have served to bring the two enterprises 
closer together.  The shift from thick rationality to thin rationality assumptions about the 
behavior of voters, legislators and bureaucrats better aligns public choice’s behavioral 
assumptions with those that market theory applies to market actors.  Acknowledging the 
possibility that political actors can be motivated by the prospect of solidary or purposive 
benefits and by principled commitments in addition to material self interest also 
complicates the analysis.  Simpler models that assume material self-interest drives all 
relevant actors have the virtue of permitting more definitive predictions, but they also 
suffer from the greater vices of not squaring with the observed facts about the actors they 
seek to model and, consequently, of producing poor predictions.  Once the stricter 
assumption of thick rationality is relaxed, the relative influence of potentially competing 
benefits needs to be assessed, and this must be done without the benefit of a 
comprehensive theory to explain their respective roles.  The question has been shown to 
be an empirical one, leading to increasing use of reduced-form analyses that study 
revealed preferences.  Until the empirical data becomes more robust, generalizations 
from specific results must be made with caution.  Environmental policy making, with its 
multiple decisions and decision making institutions, will continue to provide a fertile 
ground for the discipline’s empirical work.   
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 Even cautiously interpreted, however, the body of empirical work confirms that 
the more benign predictions of government behavior that thin rationality models generate 
are often times more reliable than the grim results of the simpler models.  Self-interest 
and self-dealing have clearly not been disproven as powerful motivators, but at the same 
time the research shows that the influence of broad-based interests and ideological 
commitments can be effective.  The possibility that government can work better than the 
grim theory predicts should prompt a greater research emphasis going forward on 
identifying institutional design features within public decision making structures that 
increase the odds for better public decisions.  That emphasis would make the parallelism 
between public choice and market theory still stronger.  Market theory has developed a 
well analyzed toolkit of instruments designed to correct for different market failures, 
including the externalities that typify most major environmental issues.  Market theory 
proposes taxes, subsidies, markets for pollution allowances and better defined property 
rights as measures that can internalize externalities.  The analogous public choice 
literature, while growing, remains more rudimentary and fragmented.  This relative lack 
of development may be partially attributable to the stress that the grim branch of the 
public choice literature has placed on abandoning government, rather than on improving 
it. Nonetheless, public choice as a field of inquiry has always contended that institutions 
matter, as evidenced by its extensive study of voting, chamber-committee structures and 
veto gates.  Once the possibility of government producing decisions that advance the 
public interest has been acknowledged, the interest in how differently constituted 
institutions can transform the same preferences of actors into different outcomes should 
be convertible into an increasingly robust literature on methods for addressing various 
types of government failure. 
 
 This work will have to proceed incrementally, because a comprehensive theory 
of public environmental policy decision making would require combining a number of 
distinct components, each complex in their own right and each at this point incomplete.  
Such a comprehensive theory would provide an account of how the preferences of voters 
and constituents influence legislator’s behavior; how the preferences of legislators, 
mediated by legislative rules and structure, influence agency behavior and how agency 
preferences, mediated by administrative rules and agency structure, legislative oversight, 
direction by the President and judicial review, produce regulatory outcomes that in turn 
influence the private behaviors that proximately cause most environmental problems.  
Lack of a comprehensive theory need not discourage research on each of its constituent 
parts; in fact, should a comprehensive theory develop, it will undoubtedly be as a result 
of prior success on individual parts.  Already, the principal-agent theory that forms the 
dominant research paradigm for several of these parts has worked on a number of 
important questions of institutional design, with more work, both theoretical and 
empirical remaining to be done.  Within the principal-agent relationship between 
legislature and agency, for instance, the question remains open whether Congress’ 
structuring of administrative rules and procedures serves to increase legislative control of 
agency outcomes to increase agency autonomy or to achieve some mix of the two. 
(McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1987, 1989; Bawn, 1995; Croley, 2008) There are both 
theoretical and empirical questions here.  Typically, principal-agent theory examines how 
to maximize control of the agent by the principal, subject to constraints of asymmetric 
 32
information, monitoring costs and operational efficiency.  In the context of legislative 
control of agencies, however, maximum control may not be theoretically desirable.  
Instead, a certain degree of agency autonomy may be preferable if that promotes 
decisions that are more technically sound; presumably, taking advantage of the greater 
technical expertise that agency’s can acquire constitutes a significant reason for 
delegating to them.  Should autonomous agencies also be better equipped to engage in the 
reasoned decision making to which theories of deliberative democracy give priority, as 
some have argued (Seidenfeld, 1992; Croley, 2008), greater agency autonomy may be 
further supported.     
 
 In the empirical realm, studies attempting to understand how specific features of 
institutional design influence agency behavior can usefully proceed independently of 
such theoretical debates, because improved instrumental understanding of how design 
affects outcomes can inform how to implement any normative theory.   Existing 
environmental studies give rise to some suggestions worthy of further exploration.  
Agencies directing Superfund clean up, for instance, seem more responsive to the 
priorities of local communities when those communities are politically active (Hamilton 
and Viscusi 1999).  Providing assistance to local communities so that they may 
participate in complex regulatory determinations also has statistically significant 
consequences for those determinations.  (Daley 2007).  On the other hand, less visible 
decisions seem more susceptible to influence by concentrated special interests, whether 
those decisions take place in the legislative chamber, in the form of votes on less visible 
amendments to bills before final passage (Hamilton 1997), or in administrative agencies, 
as in funding decisions for habitat protection, which are less visible than the initial listing 
decisions. (Metrick and Weitzman 1996; see also DeShazo and Freeman 2003).  Notice-
and-comment procedures have been studied to assess whether they provide an avenue for 
expanding the influence of broad-based interests in agency decision making, with mixed 
findings.  Cropper et. al. (1992: 195) found that environmental interests were able to 
participate “quite effectively” in pesticide rulemaking.  Magat, Krupnick and Harrington 
(1986), on the other hand, found that business comments submitted to EPA had little 
discernible influence on final effluent guidelines issued under the Clean Water Act, 
suggesting that notice-and-comment at least does not augment the influence of 
concentrated economic interests.  Results similar to Magat et al. are reported by Golden 
(1998) and Nixon, Howard and DeWitt (2002) for non-environmental rules.  In contrast, 
in a study of 40 non-environmental rules issued between 1994-2001, Yackee and Yackee 
(2006: 136) found that “business influence is enhanced when there are a high proportion 
of business comments submitted during the public comment period.”  These seemingly 
disparate findings could be consistent with the studies noted earlier in this paragraph that 
point out a difference between high and low visibility rules, because Yackee and 
Yackee’s study “focus[es] on the low salience  rulemakings that dominate most agencies’ 
regulatory agendas.” (Id., 137).  Croley’s (2008) study of some high-visibility rules lends 
further support to the supposition that broad-based interests fare better in more highly 
mobilized environmental decision.  In detailed cases studies of the EPA’s 1997 rules 
tightening the air quality standards for ozone and particulate matter, the FDA’s 1996 rule 
regulating tobacco, and the Forest Service’s 2001 “roadless rule” – all of them extremely 
high visibility, controversial rules that stimulated enormous volumes of notice and 
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comment – Croley finds in each that broad-based interests were advanced in the final 
rules, notwithstanding the concerted and organized opposition of highly organized 
economic forces arrayed against them, with no significant weakening of the rules 
emerging from the notice-and-comment process (id. 178, 195, 212).  In each case, Croley 
concludes that participation by the diffuse beneficiaries strengthened the agencies’ 
resistance to pressures to weaken the protections provided by the respective rules. 
 
 A major reason that public choice research on environmental policy making has 
evolved in the past forty years can be traced to the wave of significant environmental 
legislation enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s to address problems of conventional 
pollutants, which could not be squared with the grim predictions of early contributions to 
the field.  Currently, environmental policy making debates are dominated by the 
unresolved issues of global warming and climate change; it may well be that these issues 
will stimulate further public choice refinements.  For one thing, the recent support by 
Exxon Mobil’s CEO of a tax on carbon in excess of $20/ton runs directly counter to the 
conventional wisdom on industrial preferences for regulatory instruments.  The 
conventional wisdom insists that companies like Exxon Mobil will generally prefer direct 
regulatory controls over incentive based measures, and, if the possibilities are limited just 
to incentive-based measures, they will prefer markets with grandfathered allocations of 
allowances over auctioned allowances.  In all cases, Pigouvian taxes are the least 
preferred option.  If Tillerson’s endorsement of a tax is more than cheap talk, it ought to 
stimulate a re-analysis of firm preferences for instrument choice.  Perhaps at some point 
the price certainty of a tax becomes preferable to the alternatives.  Identifying the 
conditions under which a firm would prefer a tax – which is often market theory’s most 
preferred regulatory option – ought to be an important area for further exploration.  More 
generally, Spence (2001) suggests that public choice may need to reconsider its 
assumptions about the preferences of firms at a basic level.  He argues that contemporary 
firms are incorporating environmental responsibility into their preferences.   
 
 Even putting aside Exxon Mobil’s support of a tax, the global warming debate 
domestically and throughout the world takes it as a foregone conclusion that some from 
of incentive-based instrument will be employed in both domestic legislation and 
international agreements – and in the United States, momentum is strongly tending 
toward carbon dioxide markets that auction a considerable percentage of allowances 
rather than grandfathering existing sources.  Years ago, Stigler derided those who sought 
to effect regulatory improvements by “preaching” the virtues of market-based 
mechanisms.  Is it possible that forty more years of preaching has actually re-shaped 
policy debate so that such mechanisms have become the default choice among both 
legislators and agencies?  If so, public choice research may have to become yet more 
sensitive to the potential for ideological or principled commitments to shape regulatory 
outcomes.   
 
  Studying the role of broad-based support for innovative environmental policies 
in climate change policy may also stimulate further refinements in public choice.  So far, 
most opinion polling indicates that the public has become convinced that climate change 
is occurring and that greenhouse gases from human sources are contributing substantially 
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to the phenomenon.  The support for strong corrective measures, however, is quite thin, 
and not much changed from polls taken twenty years ago.  (Schroeder, forthcoming)  It 
will be well worth watching whether public support strengthens as the policy debate 
proceeds.  If it does, public choice research can be helpful in studying the conditions 
under which that strengthening occurs, thereby contributing to our still rudimentary 
knowledge of how social movements successfully mobilize.  In watching whether broad-
based support contributes to passage of a bill, public choice can also bear in mind that 
numerous preliminary decisions on questions of regulatory design and detail will have to 
be resolved prior to enactment.  Existing research strongly suggests that the influence of 
concentrated economic interests will be at its height with respect to these less visible 
decisions, rather than on final passage.  Careful study of how these less visible decisions 
are made and what seems to be most influential in them can also contribute significantly 
to the existing work.  
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